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* Banca d’Italia, Economic Research Department.1. Introduction
1
In May 2004 ten countries from Central and Eastern Europe and from the Mediterranean
basin (henceforth Accession Countries or AC) joined the EU. In the short to medium term, it is
to be expected that these countries will strive for closer integration with EU Member States in
the monetary ﬁeld as well by applying for ERM2 membership and, later on, for the adoption
of the euro. In this respect, an important issue is whether there are signiﬁcant differences
between the ﬁnancial structures of these countries and with respect to those of the current
members of the euro area. In particular, the structure of ﬁnancial assets and liabilities of the
corporate and household sectors has important implications for the transmission mechanism
of monetary policy: with a view to the adoption of the single monetary policy it is desirable
that the effects of monetary policy not differ signiﬁcantly between current and future members
of the euro area. This issue was analysed by a large body of literature in the late 1990s, as part
of the debate on whether countries with a diverse economic cycle and ﬁnancial structure, such
as the UK, would be able to adopt successfully a single monetary policy.
2
Against this background, the main purpose of this paper is to provide a broad picture
of the ﬁnancial structure of the three largest acceding countries (Czech Republic, Hungary
and Poland, henceforth AC3), with an emphasis on the private non-ﬁnancial sector, and to
present some econometric evidence of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in
these three countries. Previous research on the enlargement process has focussed mostly on
the banking sector.
3 While providing an overview of the whole economy, this study focuses
on the ﬁnancial structure of the corporate and household sectors, whose behaviour is crucial
for the transmission of monetary policy. In this context, the benchmark we chose for assessing
the convergence of these three countries’ ﬁnancial structures is the 15-country EU average.
1 We thank Fabio Canova and Alessandro Rebucci for their useful comments. We also thank many col-
leagues in the Economic Research Department for useful discussions, in particular Andrea Nobili, Alessandro
Secchi, Marcello Pericoli and Giovanni Veronese. Special thanks are due to Stefano Neri for his invaluable sug-
gestions and comments. We are grateful to Giovanna Poggi for her research assistance. An earlier draft of this
paper was presented at the BOFIT conference held in Saariselkä, Finland, in December 2003 and we thank all
the participants for their comments and suggestions.
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reﬂect those of the Bank
of Italy. E-mail: alessio.anzuini@bancaditalia.it, aviram.levy@bancaditalia.it.
2 Recent studies on this issue are Guiso et al. (1999) and Angeloni et al. (2002).
3 An exception is represented by Schardax and Reininger (2001).8
Although we are aware that the EU includes an “outlier” such as the UK while our paper
aims to judge how “ready” the three countries would be to adopt the single monetary policy,
nonetheless we opted for the EU benchmark because by the time these three countries are
expected to join the euro - 2008 to 2010 - it cannot be ruled out that the UK will also have
adopted the single currency.
First the paper analyses the ﬁnancial structures of the three countries - size, maturity,
currency of denomination of assets and liabilities - using their “Financial accounts” (recently
released by Eurostat) and provides a breakdown of ﬁnancial balance sheets of all sectors. Data
on the currency denomination of assets and liabilities, which provide information on exposure
to exchange rate risk and are not available in the “Financial accounts”, are calculated from
national banking statistics. Next the paper presents some econometric evidence: the VAR
estimates comparetheeffects of monetary policy in the threecountries and then assess whether
the results can be explained with the pattern of their ﬁnancial structures. The main results of
the paper can be summarised as follows.
Looking at the aggregate ﬁnancial structures of these countries, threemain features stand
out. First, the economies lack ﬁnancial depth: total ﬁnancial assets are in a range of 2.5 to 4.5
times GDP, which is far behind the EU average of 8 times GDP; ﬁnancial depth is greatest
in the Czech Republic at 4.5 times GDP. Second, the countries have a low level of ﬁnancial
intermediation (measured as the ratio of ﬁnancial assets held by banks to ﬁnancial assets held
by all other sectors), the exception being the Czech Republic, where the ratio is only slightly
below the EU average (44 per cent). Despite the low level of intermediation, banks dominate
capital markets in reallocating funds from savers to borrowers: at the end of 2001 the total
assetsofthebankingsystemwereinarangeof60to70percentofGDPinHungaryandPoland
and close to 115 per cent in the Czech Republic, whereas stock markets capitalised between 13
and 19 per cent of GDP. Third, non-residents play an important role in these ﬁnancial systems:
at an aggregate level, the heavy reliance on foreign funds translates into large net foreign debt
positions in Hungary and Poland (70 and 40 per cent of GDP, respectively). At the sector
level, a signiﬁcant role is played by foreigners in bank ownership (close to 70 per cent of bank
assets) and a large share of total bank credit is granted to domestic ﬁr m sd i r e c t l yb yb a n k s
located abroad.9
Sources of ﬁnancing of the corporate sector differ signiﬁcantly in these countries. In
terms of relative weight, while the bulk of ﬁnancial liabilities is represented everywhere
by shares (mostly not exchange traded), in the Czech Republic and in Poland (but not in
Hungary) the second largest source of ﬁnancing is trade credits. While caution is needed due
to measurement problems, this may suggest that in the Czech Republic and Poland ﬁnancial
markets are less efﬁcient in providing credit to ﬁrms than in Hungary. The weight of bank
loans in total liabilities is above the EU average, with the exception of Poland, where it is
lower. Securities play a minor role in all countries, well below the EU average.
If one considers the size of ﬁnancial liabilities in terms of GDP, Polish ﬁrms have the
lowest volume of “market debt”, i.e. outstanding securities and loans; the “market debt” for
Czech and Hungarian ﬁrms is larger (63 to 67 per cent), but well below the EU average (80
per cent). Poland’s ﬁrms also stand out for having the lowest “ﬁnancial leverage ratio”, i.e.
the ratio of securities and loans to shares (0.5, in line with the EU average), while Czech and
Hungarian ﬁrms have a higher leverage, 0.60 and 0.73 respectively. These data may seem
to imply that in Poland ﬁrms are ﬁnancially less vulnerable but monetary policy is less able
to affect their decisions via the cost and amount of bank lending; the opposite case may be
that of the Czech Republic, where ﬁrms are most dependent on external ﬁnancing and, as a
consequence, monetary policy may have more leeway.
The currency composition of corporate and household balance sheets is relevant for
monetary transmission and for ﬁnancial stability. Hungary’s and Poland’s ﬁrms denominate
more thanhalf the loans they receive fromresidentand non-resident banks inforeign currency;
Hungary’s ﬁrms stand out in terms of net worth in foreign currency, which is negative and
close to 17 per cent of GDP. In these countries the trade-off between exchange rate risk
of the corporate and the banking sector seems to favour the latter sector: Hungary’s banks
borrow heavily abroad (their net debt to foreign banks is 9 per cent of GDP, mostly in foreign
currency), but nonetheless they do not have a currency mismatch in their balance sheets,
implying that they fully transfer the exchange rate risk to domestic ﬁrms.
The household sector holds a much smaller amount of ﬁnancial assets than in the EU.
In Hungary households are ﬁnancially more sophisticated than elsewhere, holding fewer bank
deposits (46 per cent against nearly 60 per cent in the other two countries) and more securities
and shares; despite the greater diversiﬁcation, Hungary’s households are still behind their EU10
counterparts, which hold only one quarter of their assets in bank deposits. Household debt
i sv e r ys m a l l( i nar a n g eo f6t o8p e rc e n to fG D P ,c o m p a r e dw i t h6 0p e rc e n ti nt h eE U ) ,
as is households’ exposure to exchange rate risk: despite non negligible amounts of foreign
currency mortgage debt (in Poland 29 per cent of total mortgage debt), the large amounts of
foreign currency deposits mean that the net foreign currency position of households is positive,
in a range of 5 to 8 per cent of GDP.
The econometric results suggest that, despite the lower level of ﬁnancial development,
the macroeconomic variables of the three countries react to a monetary policy shock in the
standard way. Following a 1 percentage point increase in interest rates, in all countries
industrial production declines signiﬁcantly and persistently. If we exclude the ﬁr s tp a r to f
the 1990s, in all countries consumer prices tend to decline signiﬁcantly after roughly 1 year.
As for the exchange rate, in all countries a contractionary domestic monetary shock leads to an
appreciation, which is strongest in Hungary. Using previous studies on monetary transmission
in the EU as benchmarks, an important result of this exercise is that in the three accession
countries considered the contribution of a domestic monetary shock to output ﬂuctuation is in
line with previous estimates for the four largest EU economies. We conclude that no evidence
of asymmetric effects is found either between accession countries and current EU members or
among accession countries. Three additional results are worth mentioning. The ﬁrst is that for
all countries the exchange rate seems to play an important role in the transmission mechanism,
i.e. the exchange rate always reacts signiﬁcantly in the expected direction. The second result
is that in Hungary the effects of a domestic monetary shock on output and exchange rates are
greater (on average) than in the other two countries. However, it is important to note that,
even if the identiﬁcation scheme is the same and the shock is normalised across countries so
that comparisons are possible to some degree, the conﬁdence bands are generally large enough
to ensure that differences in averages may not be signiﬁcant. The third result is that Poland
has the most stable impulse response functions. For this country, the estimated responses are
stable not only over time but also across different identiﬁcation schemes.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 analyses the ﬁnancial structure of the AC3
to assess its implications for the monetary transmission mechanism. Section 3 contains VAR
system estimates, conducted separately on each acceding country, to trace the effects of a
monetary policy shock. Section 4 concludes.11
2. Financial structures of the Czech republic, Hungary and Poland
The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are the largest economies within the 10 ACs
and they were among the ﬁrst to complete the transition from planned to market economy,
as witnessed by their early membership of the OECD (1995-96). While a macroeconomic
analysis of these countries is beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth noting that they
have made substantial progress in their convergence towards current EU members (see EU
Commission (2002)), with some differences depending on whether macroeconomic (e.g.
inﬂation and public ﬁnance) or structural convergence (per capita incomes, structure of value
added, market functioning) is considered.
Before examining the ﬁnancial structures of these countries it is worth recalling the main
features of their monetary and exchange rate policy. While all three pursue a monetary policy
strategy based on inﬂation targeting, some differences exist in their exchange rate policies.
4
The Czech Republic and Poland pursue a free ﬂoat. The former adopted this regime - although
de facto the ﬂoat is partially managed - after the severe currency crisis of 1997 which forced
the authorities to abandon the soft peg which was in place. In contrast, Poland has a longer
history of exchange rate ﬂexibility: in 1991 the authorities adopted a currency basket peg but
in 1995 they switched to a “crawling band” regime, with the band of the crawl being gradually
widened until the currency was allowed to ﬂoat freely in April 2000. Hungary has traditionally
been more averse to exchange rate ﬂexibility: the country has slowly shifted from a narrow
crawling band, adopted in 1995, to a horizontal and wide band, introduced in 2001. The size of
the bands (±15 per cent) suggests that Hungarian authorities have been shadowing the ERM 2
arrangements.
When considering the ﬁnancial structures of the AC3, there are at least three features
which stand out.
5 The ﬁrst is the lack of ﬁnancial depth. As can be seen from Figure 1, in the
AC3 the amount of total ﬁnancial assets is between 2.5 to 4.5 times GDP, as opposed to 8 times
for the EU average. The size ofﬁnancial assets also differs signiﬁcantly among the AC3: in the
Czech Republic ﬁnancial assets are 4.5 times GDP (more than half the EU average), whereas
4 The alternative strategies for joining the ERM and adopting the euro in these countries have been dis-
cussed, among others, in Corker et al. (2000) and Begg et al. (2003).
5 An overview of the ﬁnancial structures of accession countries can be found in Caviglia et al. (2002);
country analyses of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are presented, respectively, by Ihnat and Prochazka
(2002), Zsambòki (2002) and Bednarski and Osinski (2002).12
for Hungary and Poland ﬁnancial assets are less than 3 times GDP (and roughly one third of
the EU average). If one considers ﬁnancial liabilities the picture does not change signiﬁcantly
in terms of distance from the EU, although the gap among the AC3 becomes smaller.
6
A second major feature of the AC3 is the low level of ﬁnancial intermediation, which is
associated, nonetheless, with thedominance ofbanks over capital markets.
7 Asimpleindicator
of the role played the banking system is the “Financial Intermediation Ratio”
8 (the ratio of
ﬁnancial assets held by banks to ﬁnancial assets held by all other sectors): Figure 2 shows that
in Hungary and Poland the ratio ranges from 22 to 27; the Czech Republic stands out in that
the relative share of banks (roughly 38 per cent) is much closer to the EU average (44 per cent).
Nonetheless banks dominate capital markets in reallocating funds from savers to borrowers: at
the end of 2001 the total assets of the banking system were in a range of 60 to 70 per cent of
GDP in Hungary and Poland and close to 115 per cent in the Czech Republic (compared with
total assets close to 280 per cent in the EU). In contrast, at the end of 2001 the stock markets of
these three countries capitalized between 13 and 19 per cent of GDP (85 per cent in the EU).
A third major characteristic of the ﬁnancial systems in the AC3 is the important role
played by non-residents. The large reliance on foreign funds translates into large net foreign
debt positions (Figure 3): net debt is above 70 per cent of GDP in Hungary and above 40 per
cent in Poland. In this regard the Czech Republic is closer to the EU average: both have net
foreign debts which are below 10 per cent of GDP. At a sector level the reliance on foreign
capital takes two main forms. The ﬁrst is the signiﬁcant role played by foreigners in bank
ownership: in all the AC3, foreign-owned institutions account for nearly 70 per cent of total
bank assets. The second way of providing funds to the country is bank credit which is granted
directly by banks located abroad to domestic ﬁrms, bypassing local banks. As we shall see
below, in Hungary and Poland roughly 30 to 35 per cent of total bank credit to domestic
6 A detailed and updated analysis of ﬁnancial structures of EU countries is provided by Bartiloro and De
Bonis (2003)
7 The banking systems of these countries underwent signiﬁcant transformations in the 1990s. The painful
transition from planned to market economies entailed severe banking crises and expensive bailouts: Schardax
and Reininger (2001) put the ﬁscal costs of the crises occurring in the mid 1990s at 12 per cent of GDP in the
Czech Republic and 7 per cent in Hungary. At present commercial banks in these countries are considered to be
generally sound (in terms of capital ratios, asset quality and proﬁtability) and well supervised (see ECB (2002)).
8 This indicator was ﬁrst proposed by Goldsmith (1969).13
ﬁrms is granted directly by banks located abroad whereas in the Czech Republic - where the
domestic banking system is much larger - this share is close to 16 per cent.
2.1 The corporate sector
A careful examination of balance sheets shows that the sources of ﬁnancing of non-
ﬁnancial ﬁrms in the AC3 countries differ signiﬁcantly. Table 1 provides an overview of the
relative weight of ﬁnancial liabilities. The bulk of such liabilities is represented everywhere
by shares - most of them not publicly traded - which account for around 40 per cent in the
Czech Republic and in Poland and over 55 per cent in Hungary, the same level as in the EU.
In the Czech Republic and in Poland the second largest source of ﬁnancing (around one third
of total liabilities) is represented by trade credits (item “other accounts”). Reading the data at
face value - but trade credits are difﬁcult to measure in a precise and harmonised way - one
may conclude that in these two countries the ﬁnancial markets are less efﬁcient in providing
credit to ﬁrms than in Hungary, where trade credits account for less than 10 per cent, as in the
EU.
Bank loans represent only 19 per cent of total liabilities in Poland and 34 per cent in
Hungary, with the Czech Republic in the middle (27 per cent). With the exception of Poland,
these values are above the EU level (25 per cent). Securities play a minor role in all countries
(2 to 2.5 per cent in the Czech Republic and in Poland, 0.5 in Hungary), well below the EU
average.
In Table 2 some of the above-mentioned ﬁnancial instruments are presented in terms of
GDPanda“ﬁnancialleverageratio”iscalculatedasaratioofinternaltoexternalﬁnancing(i.e.
the ratio of shares to securities and loans). In the last column a comparison is provided with the
EU average. The table highlights the fact that Polish ﬁrms have the lowest “market debt”, i. e.
securities and loans outstanding, in terms of GDP (35 per cent), which compares with 63 to 67
per cent for the other two countries. The size of market debt of Czech and Hungarian ﬁrms is
60 per cent, which in turn is well below the EU average (80 per cent). Together with the lowest
sheer size of market debt, Polish ﬁrms also boast the lowest ﬁnancial leverage (0.5), which is
the same as the EU average; in contrast, Czech and Hungarian ﬁrms have higher leverage,
0.60 to 0.73. To summarize, Polish ﬁrms seem to have the lowest leverage and Czech ﬁrms
the highest: a possible implication for monetary policy transmission is that in Poland ﬁrms14
are ﬁnancially less vulnerable but monetary policy is less able to affect their decisions by
controlling the cost and the amount of their ﬁnancing. The Czech Republic represents the
opposite case, with ﬁrms more dependent on external ﬁnancing and, as a consequence, with
potentially more leeway for monetary policy.
In addition to the composition of ﬁnancial liabilities by instrument, important
information on the soundness of the corporate sector is provided by the analysis of the
currencycomposition ofdebt. Asalready mentioned, foreigncurrency debt(providedbyeither
domestic or non-resident banks) allows larger amounts of funds to be tapped at lower cost,
since ﬁrms typically do not hedge the exchange rate risk. However, foreign debt represents
a contingent liability which makes ﬁrms vulnerable to currency depreciation. As already
highlighted by a large body of literature
9 such balance sheet effects and the associated wave of
corporate bankruptcies can make Keynesian expansionary policies ineffective and, in extreme
cases, trigger banking crises and costly public bailouts.
Table 3.1 shows the currency composition of corporate balance sheets. If we look at
liabilities, the table shows that Hungarian and, to a lesser extent, Polish ﬁrms choose to
denominatein foreign currency morethan half theloanstheyreceive(originatingfrom resident
and non-resident banks), whereas Czech companies denominate only one fourth of their loans
in foreign currency. In order to have a complete picture it is useful to consider also the sheer
size of foreign currency debt, i. e. the net worth in foreign currency
10 as a ratio to GDP (Table
3.2). In this case too, Hungarian ﬁrms have the largest imbalance (net foreign currency debt is
17 per cent of GDP) whereas Polish ﬁrms have the lowest net position.
Theexperienceoftheﬁnancial crises thathit many emerging economies in thelate1990s
has shown that there is a trade-off between the exposure to exchange rate risk of the corporate
sector as opposed to the banking system. Asian banks typically borrowed abroad in foreign
currency (bearing all the currency risk) and lent in domestic currency to domestic ﬁrms (which
bore no risk), whereas in Latin America, notably in Argentina, the opposite occurred.
11 The
9 See, among the most recent studies, Levy (2002), Cespedes Chang, and Velasco (2002), and Allen et al.
(2003).
10 Net worth is deﬁned as the difference between foreign exchange assets and liabilities, vis-à-vis both resi-
dent and non resident counterparts.
11 See, among others, Levy (2002).15
data presented in Table 4 suggest that for the AC3 the trade-off follows the Latin American
pattern. Hungary’s banks borrow heavily abroad (see Table 4.2): their net debt to foreign
banks is 9 per cent of GDP, mostly in foreign currency. This is consistent with the fact, noted
above, that the country has a large net external debt. In contrast, Czech and Polish banks are
net lenders: their net credit position is equal to 6 and 3 per cent of GDP, respectively. Despite
the heavy external (which is mostly foreign currency denominated) debt, Hungary’s banks do
not have a currency mismatch in their balance sheets: Table 4.1 shows that 29 per cent of
assets are in foreign currency versus 27 per cent of liabilities, suggesting that domestic banks
borrow abroad but fully transfer these foreign currency funds to domestic ﬁrms, remaining
with a slightly “long position” in foreign currency. Moreover Czech banks have no currency
mismatch whereas Polish banks have a “long” foreign currency mismatch (25 percent against
19 per cent).
2.2 The household sector
Balance sheets of the household sector play an important role in the transmission
mechanism of monetary policy. For instance, a monetary tightening can reduce consumption
both via the increased cost of servicing mortgage or credit card debt (income effects) and via
the reduced value of ﬁnancial assets such as bonds and, sometimes, stocks (wealth effects). In
thisregardsome information about the relevance of income andwealtheffectscanbe extracted
from the composition and size of households’ ﬁnancial assets and liabilities.
Two stylised facts emerge from the breakdown of ﬁnancial assets shown in Table 5.
First, households in the AC3 countries hold a much smaller amount of ﬁnancial assets in terms
of GDP (55 per cent in Poland, 83 in the Czech Republic and Hungary in the middle) than
EU households (around 230 per cent). Secondly, in Hungary households are ﬁnancially more
sophisticated than elsewhere: they hold less bank deposits (45 against almost 60 per cent in the
other two) and more securities and shares (44 against 25 per cent). Although ﬁnancially more
diversiﬁed than in Poland and the Czech Republic, households in Hungary are still behind EU
households, which hold only one quarter of their assets in bank deposits.
As for household borrowing, Table 6 shows that in all AC3 countries household debt is
very small in terms of GDP, between 6 and 8 per cent; this compares with 60 per cent for the
EU.16
In these countries households’ exposure to exchange rate risk is limited. The exception
may be Polish households, for which 29 per cent of mortgage debt is denominated in foreign
currency (Table 7.1). Reﬂecting the fact that bank deposits in foreign currency are much larger
than foreign currency mortgage debt, the overall net foreign currency position of households
in these countries is positive, ranging from 5 to 8 per cent of GDP (Table 7.2).
3. The effects of monetary shocks in AC3
The effectiveness of monetary policy is closely related to the transmission of a monetary
impulse from the central bank’s key rates to money market and then other ﬁxed income
interest rates. The transmission from the money market to the lending rates applied by
banks to non-banks is the other part of the story. The degree of development of the ﬁnancial
markets and their proper functioning are therefore crucial for the propagation of monetary
impulses. The effect of the interest rates on the exchange rate is obviously another important
channel. The “closed economy effects” may be divided into three components: effects due
to ﬁrms’ behaviour, effects due to households’ behaviour and the effects of ﬁnancial structure
development, i.e. the more developed the ﬁnancial system the more effective is monetary
policy. In the theoretical literature there are two major classes of models used to study the
effects of a monetary shock: “limited participation models” and “money in utility function
models” are standard examples
12. In both classes of models, following a contractionary
monetary shock the interest rate increases, prices decrease and output does not increase; it
is worth noting, however, that similar effects are reached through very different transmission
mechanisms.
In a “limited participation” model, following an injection of liquidity by the authority
the available funds that banks can lend to ﬁrms increase, ﬁrms can raise investment and the
increased investment boosts economic activity. In the real world this mechanism is represented
by the credit channel. Since we expect the credit channel to play a central role in ﬁrms’
response to changes in monetary policy, we use the share of bank loans to total liabilities as
an indicator of ﬁrms’ expected reaction to interest rate changes, i.e. the higher this share is,
the more ﬁrms should be affected by monetary impulses. As Table 1 shows, Hungary has the
highest share at 34 per cent. It is worth noting that this ﬁgure is high not only compared with
12 See Walsh (2001) for an extensive treatment of monetary models.17
the other two AC considered (Czech Republic 27.2 per cent and Poland 19.2 per cent) but also
compared with the EU average (24.8 per cent).
In a “money in utility function” model, some nominal rigidity is usually introduced in
order to obtain real effects from a nominal shock; price stickiness, for example, is a standard
assumption to obtain a positive co-movement of nominal and real interest rates. In this
class of models, as in most microfounded models, the interest rate plays a role because it
enters the Euler equation which gives the optimal consumption path for the representative
household. An increase in the interest rate increases the cost of today’s consumption in terms
of future consumption and therefore the optimal household’s response is a decrease in today’s
consumption. Since those models are usually demand driven, a contraction in one component
of the demand reduces real activity. In the real world this mechanism is difﬁcult to isolate. An
increase in the interest rate may impact directly on the expected future income and through it
on consumption if the share of mortgage payments to total payments is a non-negligible part
of households’ balance sheets. For this reason we use this share as an indicator of the expected
reaction of households, i.e. the higher this share the greater the impact of monetary policy.
As Table 6 shows, in the AC3 household debt is very low compared with the EU average.
For the Czech Republic and Poland loans to households account for 8 per cent of GDP and for
Hungary 6 per cent.
The previous chapter presented a description of the ﬁnancial systems in the AC3, Figure
1.1 shows the ratio of ﬁnancial assets to GDP. While all AC3 are well below the EU average,
the Czech Republic is above the other two countries. The so called “Financial Intermediation
Ratio” (Figure 2) is lower than the EU average in all AC3, again with the Czech Republic
closer to the EU. On a more disaggregated level the picture is slightly different. The structure
of ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial liabilities suggests that Hungarian ﬁrms are able to raise risk capital to an
extent similar to EU members. The fraction of stocks in total liabilities in Hungary is 56.1 per
cent, a level very close to the EU average of 60.6 per cent. The share is lowest in the Czech
Republic (39.5 per cent) and Poland’s share is 42.9 per cent. Even if deposits are the favourite
asset for carrying wealth over time (Table 6) in the AC3, the percentage of “shares and mutual
funds” of Hungarian households (34.9 per cent) is very close to the EU average (33.5 per cent).
If we take those numbers as a proxy of ﬁnancial development we can say that the AC3
have low levels of ﬁnancial depth and ﬁnancial intermediation. Moreover, an important role is18
played by non-residents. At an aggregate level, the ﬁnancial development of those countries
is still behind that of EU. At a microeconomic level the behaviour of ﬁrms and households
in Hungary is more in line with the EU average. However, despite the lack of ﬁnancial
development, we argue that in the AC3 the effects of a contractionary monetary policy shock
arequalitativelynotdissimilartothatfoundinthemoreadvancedeconomiesandnotdissimilar
from the predictions of a large class of theoretical models.
3.1 The empirical model
This exercise aims to analyze the effects of a contractionary monetary shock in the
AC3. We estimate a ﬁve variable VAR system, one for each AC country considered, i.e.
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. All estimated VARs are just identiﬁed systems. All
identifying restrictions are short run restrictions, i.e. zeros in the impact matrix. All variables
are expressed in log levels (except interest rates); we implicitly assume that there is enough
cointegration so that they are jointly covariance stationary, Sims (1990). In all regressions, a
complete set of dummy variables is included to capture any seasonality effect. The lag length
of each system is chosen to strike a balance between two needs: eliminate the autocorrelation
of residuals and preserve as many degrees of freedom as possible. We chose to perform a
Ljiung-Box test and increase the number of lags up to the point where the autocorrelation was
notsigniﬁcantata5 percentlevel. Since theLjiung-Box test hasastrong smallsample bias we
always evaluate the lag structure obtained from this test against a set of alternatives using AIC
(Akaike Information Criterion) and SBC (Schwartz Bayesian Criterion). In the VAR literature
no general consensus has emerged on the ordering to assume for the variables included in the
system. An illuminating survey on the topic is Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1998).
Moreover, no general consensus has emerged on the use of the recursive structure in the
identiﬁcation process. However, it is possible to put the identiﬁcation schemes based on
short run restriction into two groups: the recursive structure as in Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans (1998) and the non-recursive structure as in Kim (1999). Both identiﬁcation schemes
are designed to recover only the effects of a monetary policy shock. In both schemes a
contractionary monetary policy shock is a positive innovation in the nominal interest rate and
the line in which the nominal interest rate appears as endogenous variable is interpreted as
a reaction function of the monetary authorities. While in the recursive structure the Wold
order of the variables implicitly assumes that monetary authorities choose the interest rate by19
looking at the current level of prices and output and assumes that output and the price level
do not change in the impact period but react only with one period delay, in the non-recursive
identiﬁcation approach (hereafter, Structural VAR) each line has its own interpretation (see
Kim, 1999) and it is assumed that monetary authorities, due to an information delay, do not
see the current value of prices and output when choosing the interest rate
13.
More precisely, the variables are stored in the vector yt. The structural form is:
C (L)yt = ηt
where C(L) is a polynomial matrix in the lag operator and VCV(ηt)=Λ is a diagonal matrix
withthevariancesofthestructural shocksaselements. Weestimate(ignoringpredeterminates)
the reduced form:
yt = A(L)yt−1 + εt
where A(L) is a polynomial matrix in the lag operator and VCV(εt)=Σ and ηt = C0εt
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where the variables in the vector yt =( cpi,ip,m,i,cp) are: prices, industrial production,
money, interest rate and commodity prices. The C0 matrix identiﬁes the relation between
the structural disturbances ηt and the reduced form residuals εt. We also try a version of the
system excluding money from the VAR. While results, in this speciﬁc exercise, did not change
signiﬁcantly, it is worth noting that the estimation of a VAR system without money carries
risks in the sense that a confusion is likely to arise between a money demand shock and a
money supply shock.
13 Sims and Zha (1995) made similar assumptions.20
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where a gij means that the coefﬁcient is not constrained. The ﬁrst line is a money supply
equation modeled as a reaction function of the monetary authority, the second line is a
standard money demand equation, the third and fourth lines encapsulate the hypothesis of
price stickiness or adjustment cost. The ﬁfth line is an arbitrage equation.
In the ﬁrst scheme we normalize the shock to a 1 per cent increase in interest rates
whereas when we use the second scheme the size of the shock is the commonly used one
standard deviation.
In both schemes the last variable is the world export price in domestic currency, i.e.
the product of the nominal exchange rate and the world export price in U.S. dollars. The
inclusion of the last variable is motivated, in the VAR literature, by the need for some control
for imported inﬂation or, more generally, to control for an endogenous increase in the interest
rate. Since we are dealing with a very small open economy we will interpret the movements
of this last variable, conditional on a monetary shock, as the movement of the nominal
exchange rate. Both identiﬁcation schemes allow nominal exchange rate to react immediately
to the monetary shock, but only the second one assumes that monetary authorities look at the
contemporaneous value of the exchange rate while choosing nominal interest rate. In order
to avoid changes in the transmission mechanism of a monetary policy shock we would like to
deal with economies for which the exchange rate arrangements do not change in the estimation
period. Unfortunately, all the small open economies considered have modiﬁed the exchange
rate regime in the sample period used for the estimates (see the Table 8).
This last consideration may cast some doubts on the plausibility of a stable linear model
for AC3 countries. However, even if a model with stochastic regime switches might be more
appropriate for transition economies, the estimates in this paper may be of some interest
as they summarize relations in the data averaged over different states. Moreover, it is not
completely clear how the exchange rate regime affects the transmission of a monetary shock
in less industrialized economies (see for example Canova, 2003).21
In all the systems we identify only a monetary shock. In all systems impulse response
functions with a 48 month horizon after the shock are considered. Following a standard
Montecarlo experiment, conﬁdence bands at 68 per cent and 95 per cent signiﬁcance level
are plotted in all impulse response functions recovered with the ﬁrst identiﬁcation scheme.
Conﬁdence bands at 68 per cent signiﬁcance level, calculated by means of a Bayesian
Montecarlo experiment (Sims and Zha, 1999), are plotted for all estimates obtained using the
second identiﬁcation scheme. We use monthly data covering the period 1993-2002. Results
are encouraging: despite the lack of ﬁnancial development, for all the AC3, conditional on
a monetary shock, macroeconomic variables display standard behaviour. In all the impulse
responses recovered, following an increase in interest rates, industrial production declines and
the exchange rate tends to appreciate. The price level declines when the second part of the
1990s is used as a sample period for estimation, while we get a signiﬁcant price puzzle when
we use the entire sample. This last result applies to the Czech Republic and Hungary, but not
to Poland. Results for Poland are robust across sample periods as well as across identiﬁcation
schemes.
3.1.1 Czech Republic
For the Czech Republic three lags seem enough to capture the dynamics of the system.
Using the entire sample (1993:01-2002:01) it is difﬁcult to get a clear-cut dynamic response
with a recursive or a non-recursive identiﬁcation scheme. In particular, while industrial
production and the exchange rate move in the expected direction (at a 68 per cent signiﬁcance
level) money does not move signiﬁcantly and we get a counter-intuitive change in prices (see
Figure 4). The increase in the price level following a contractionary monetary policy shock
is called “price puzzle” in the literature. In this case, however, there might be an explanation.
In the ﬁrst part of the 1990s the price system in the Czech Republic was mostly based on
administrative controls; those controls only gradually were removed and the price formation
mechanism started to work as in a market economy. By the second part of the 1990s and the
beginning of 2000, the Czech Republic had done most of the way to become a fully ﬂedged
market economy. Indeed, if we use the second part of the 1990s as a sample period (1997:07-
2002:01, ﬂoating exchange rate regime), with the recursive identiﬁcation scheme we get a
very different picture from the one obtained using the entire sample. All variables move in
the expected direction and almost all of them at a 95 per cent signiﬁcance level (Figure 5).22
After roughly a year industrial production reaches its negative peak, the nominal exchange
rate appreciates at impact and the price puzzle disappears. The price level follows closely the
movement of the monetary aggregate and both variables decrease signiﬁcantly and reach a
negative peak with only few months delay with respect to industrial production. The Czech
Republicistheonlycountryforwhichwewerenotableto recoverclear-cutdynamicresponses
using the non-recursive identiﬁcation scheme and therefore the impulse responses are not
shown. In this experiment the exclusion of money from the variables in the VAR does not
change the results signiﬁcantly (see Figure 6). However caution is needed when estimating
a system without a monetary aggregate since if we do not control for money we may ﬁnd
it difﬁcult to disentangle the effects of a money supply shock from the effects of a money
demand shock. Only the former should be interpreted as a monetary policy shock. We also
tried to change the position of the last two variables in order to allow interest rates to be set by
monetary authorities taking exchange rate movements into account (this identiﬁcation may be
m o t i v a t e db yt h es oc a l l e d“ f e a ro fﬂoating”, see Calvo and Reinhart 2002) and results did not
change signiﬁcantly. The quick and sizeable response of the exchange rate (an appreciation
close to 2 percent during theﬁrsttwoquartersaftertheshock) maybeduetothehighelasticity
of portfolio investment. Since we are dealing with a small open economy we assume that the
shock has no impact on world export quantities. Therefore, two channels are operating at
the same time: the interest rate channel (and through it the credit channel) and the exchange
rate channel. An increase in the interest rate should depress economic activity through tighter
creditconditions(limitedparticipationmodel), while the increased interestrate attractsforeign
funds and appreciates the currency. The nominal appreciation of the currency may depress the
economy even more if, due to some stickiness, it affects the relative price of domestic and
foreign goods. Overall, the shape of the dynamic responses of the Czech Republic, since the
end of the 1990s, are strikingly similar to what we observed in more advanced economies such
as the G-7.
3.1.2 Hungary
For Hungary four lags seem sufﬁcient to capture the dynamics of the system. Point
estimates are surrounded by considerable uncertainty, which enlarges conﬁdence bands. When
we use the entire sample the 95 per cent conﬁdence bands easily include the zero line. If we
look at the 68 per cent signiﬁcance level we are confronted with more reasonable dynamics. At23
impact, money and the exchange rate decrease, with both effects very short-lived; industrial
production decreases (at 95 per cent signiﬁcance level) and prices do not move (see Figure
7). Using the non-recursive identiﬁcation scheme the results do not change drastically: all
variables move (not signiﬁcantly) in the correct direction (see Figure 8). In this case too, when
using a subperiod that excludes the very ﬁrst years of transition (1995:04-2002:01, a crawling
peg exchange rate regime with few months with different regimes) we get much more clear-cut
dynamic responses (see Figure 9). All variables move in the expected direction and besides
money all movements are signiﬁcant at every considered signiﬁcance level. The effects on
industrialproductionandtheexchangerateareparticularlystrong: theformervariabledisplays
a negativepeak of roughly 2.5 per cent, the latterappreciates by around 3.5 percent. Prices and
money decline signiﬁcantly. Our results are independent of the identiﬁcation scheme adopted
(see Figure10) and excluding money do not impact on the signs of the responses (see Figure
11). However, when we exclude money we save some degrees of freedom and, with such a
short time series, even this small increase in the degrees of freedom affects the precision of the
estimates; in this case excluding money from the system reduces uncertainty. For Hungary as
well we can conclude that is possible to recover standard responses when we exclude the ﬁrst
half of the 1990s.
3.1.3 Poland
For Poland we were not able to estimate an equation without serial correlation until we
included the ﬁfth lag. The impulse responses for Poland are surprisingly stable. Using the
entire sample we get clear-cut dynamics, conditional on a monetary shock, for all variables
(see Figure 12). Results are robust across identiﬁcation schemes (see ﬁg.13). Excluding
money does not affect results (see ﬁg.14). We estimate the system using different years as
starting point (1993, 1994, 1995,1996) and results do not change signiﬁcantly. While the
responses are strikingly stable, the real effect of a monetary shock is small, i.e. industrial
production declines signiﬁcantly but the negative peak is around 1/4 and 1/3 of one percentage
point. An explanation for this result is suggested by Bednarski and Osinski (2002). They
argue that the weak transmission is due to two peculiarities of Poland’s banking system:
excess liquidity and unwillingness to cut credit when monetary policy is tightened. Excess
liquidity is deﬁned as high level of banks’ holdings of central bank debt. The strong capital
inﬂow made the commercial banks less dependent on the central bank. The unwillingness to24
c u tc r e d i ti sm a i n l yr e ﬂected in the utilization of securities as buffer stock. Due to the large
holdings of securities, banks can reduce their accumulation instead of cutting credit following
a contractionary monetary shock.
Table 9 shows the variance decomposition for the four main European economies, as
estimated by Kim (1999), together with our estimates for the three AC countries. The table
suggests that the contribution of the domestic monetary shock to output ﬂuctuation, in the AC
countries considered is in line with the four largest EU economies. The largest contribution is
foundinHungary. ThefactthattheresponsesoftheAC3displayasimilaritywithEUmembers
is important because this signals the absence of a particularly strong asymmetry in the effects
of monetary policy. Once those countries adopt the euro they will give up their monetary
sovereignty and the exchange rate channel will weaken signiﬁcantly. The optimum currency
area literature suggests that the cost of giving up those instruments should be lower the higher
thesymmetryinresponseto acommonshock. Sincenostrongevidenceofasymmetryemerges
in our exercise this would suggest that the cost of entering may be relatively low. A similar
conclusion is reached in Frenkel and Nickel (2002), who analyse the differences in the effects
of demand and supply shocks on EMU and AC countries.
4. Conclusions
The ﬁnancial accounts of the three countries considered provide a picture of a private
non-ﬁnancial sector that is, not surprisingly, ﬁnancially less mature than the EU average. The
business sector covers a large portion of its ﬁnancing needs with non-market instruments,
such as trade credits and non-exchange-traded shares. In addition, a number of factors -
probably related to both cost and availability - induce the business sector to denominate in
foreign currency a large portion of the bank loans it receives, thus bearing a non-negligible
exchangeraterisk. MoreoverthehouseholdsectorislesssophisticatedthanitsEUcounterpart:
the composition of its ﬁnancial assets is tilted in favour of bank deposits whereas ﬁnancial
liabilities, such as consumer credit and mortgage loans, are still relatively small. Despite
the lack of ﬁnancial development, the econometric results suggest that the co-movement of
macroeconomic variables in each of the AC countries, conditional on a domestic monetary
shock, is not different from the standard behaviour we would expect, at least when we exclude
the ﬁrst years of the transition. In these three countries the impact of monetary policy on
the exchange rate is always the expected one. Presumably this is due to a high elasticity of25
portfolio investment to the interest rate differential. We ﬁnd no evidence of counter-intuitive
effects of a monetary policy shock in the AC3 economies. Following a 1 per cent increase in
interest rates, in all the three countries considered industrial production declines persistently
and signiﬁcantly. Themaincaveat ofouranalysisisthatthenumberofobservationsinourtime
series is very small and there might be a measurement error issue. We decided not to account
explicitly for a measurement error because in our view from 1993 on the data quality for those
countries should be more reliable, if not comparable with those of advanced economies. Even
if some caution is required in interpreting our results, it is possible to argue that in the AC3 the
contribution of monetary policy to business cycle ﬂuctuations does not differ too much from
that observed in current EU members.Appendix: Data description
Financial accounts and currency composition of assets and liabilities
Data on (non-consolidated) ﬁnancial assets and liabilities of each sector, which were
used in Figures 1, 2 and 3 and Tables 1, 2, 5 and 6, were downloaded from the Cronos database
of Eurostat. The data are stocks outstanding at end-2000 for Hungary and Poland, end-1999
for the Czech Republic. The EU average is calculated with 12 countries, i.e. all members as
of 2003 except for Greece, Ireland and Luxembourg.
Thecurrency composition of assets and liabilities ofbanks, households andﬁrms (Tables
3, 4 and 7) was calculated by combining national sources and BIS data.
Czech Republic: website of the Czech National Bank, statistical database, table
“Monthly asset and liability statement - commercial banks”
Hungary: website of the central bank, statistical database, Table S.122 “Aggregate
balance-sheet of other monetary ﬁnancial institutions”
Poland: National Bank of Poland, “Summary evaluation of the ﬁnancial situation of
Polish banks - First half 2002”, Table 14.
BIS data are published in the “BIS Quarterly Review”, Tables 6A “External positions
of reporting banks vis-à-vis individual countries; vis-à-vis all sectors” and 6B “External
positions of reporting banks vis-à-vis individual countries; vis-à-vis non-banks”
Most data series used for the econometric estimates were obtained from the IMF’s
International ﬁnancial statistics, as follows:
Industrial Production
Czech Republic: 935..66; Hungary: 944..66; Poland; POIPTOT.H (Datastream)
Consumer Prices
Czech Republic: 935..64; Hungary: 944..64; Poland: 964..64
Interest Rate
Czech Republic: 935..60b; Hungary: 944..60; Poland: 964..60b27
Monetary aggregates
Czech Republic: 93535..; Hungary: HNM3....A; Poland: 96435..
Exchange Rate
Czech Republic: 935..rf; Hungary: 944..rf; Poland: 964..rf
World export commodity price
00176axd
World export commodity price in terms of domestic currency
This variable is constructed by multiplying the exchange rate (deﬁned as the amount of
domestic currency needed per U.S. dollar) and the world commodity price in U.S. dollars.Figures and tables 








Czech Rep. Poland Hungary EU
Source: Eurostat. (1) Ratio of financial assets held by monetary financial institutions to financial assets 
held by all non-financial sectors and the rest of the world. For the Czech Republic, data refer to 1999.D/dati/avi/paesi accession/chart2.doc 27/05/04Monetary shock (Czech Republic)
CPI
months after shock

















































Figure 4: Recursive identification scheme, sample period 1993:01-2002:01.
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Figure 5: Recursive identification scheme, sample period 1997:07-2002:01.Monetary shock (Czech Republic)
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months after shock




































































































Figure 7: Recursive identification scheme, sample period 1993:01-2002:01.Monetary shock (Hungary)
Interest rate
months after shock






















































































































Figure 9: Recursive identification scheme, sample period 1995:04-2002:01.Monetary shock (Hungary)
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months after shock
































































































Figure 11: Recursive identification scheme, sample period 1993:01-2002:01, without money.Monetary shock (Poland)
CPI
months after shock



















































Figure 12: Recursive identification scheme, sample period 1993:01-2002:01.


























































Figure 13: Non-recursive identification scheme, sample period 1993:01-2002:01.Monetary shock (Poland)
CPI
months after shock







































Figure 14: Recursive identification scheme, sample period 1993:01-2002:01, without money.Czech Rep. Poland Hungary EU
Securities 1.9 2.5 0.4 3.8
Loans 27.2 19.2 34.0 24.8
Shares 39.5 42.9 56.1 60.6
Corporate pension 
funds 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1
Other accounts 31.5 35.4 9.5 9.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Eurostat. 
(1) For the Czech Republic, data refer to 1999.
Table 1: Breakdown of corporate financial liabilities
by instrument 
(1) (end 2000)
Czech Rep. Poland Hungary EU
Securities (A) 4.3 4.0 0.7
Loans (B) 62.5 30.9 62.4
Shares and other 
equity (C) 90.9 69.1 102.7 160
Financial leverage 0.73 0.51 0.60 0.50
(ratio of A+B to C)
Source: Eurostat. 
(1) For the Czech Republic, data refer to 1999.
Table 2: Corporate liabilities as a percentage of GDP 
(1)
(end 2000)
80Share of FX 
deposits
Share of FX 
loans
Czech Rep. n.a. 27.2%
Hungary 25.3% 56.0%
Poland  28.2% 50.6%
Source: Own calculations on Central banks statistics.
(1) The share of FX deposits and loans is calculated taking into account also deposits and loans with 
non resident banks, reported by the BIS. For Poland, end June.
Czech Rep.  (2) -11.2%
Hungary -16.6%
Poland -9.2%
Source: Own calculations on Central banks statistics.
(1) The net foreign currency position is calculated as a difference between foreign exchange assets and
 liabilities. Assets/liabilities held abroad are taken from the BIS. For Poland, data refer to end June 2002.
(2) Data on foreign currency assets held domestically were not available.
Net FX position
Table 3.2: Corporate net foreign currency
position as a ratio to GDP 
(1) (end 2002)
Table 3.1: Corporate exposure to exchange rate risk 
(1)
(percentage share of foreign currency deposits and loans; end 2002)Share of FX 
assets
Share of FX 
liabilities
Czech Rep. 16.1% 15.2%
Hungary 29.0% 26.8%
Poland (2) 24.6% 18.8%
Sources: Own calculations based on Central bank statistics; BIS
(1) For Poland, end June 2002.
(2) Foreign currency assets and liabilities of banks in Poland were calculated by adding up
data from the central bank with those published by the BIS on international bankig.
Net external 
position
Czech Rep.  + 6%
Hungary - 9%
Poland + 3%
Source: BIS Quarterly Review, March 2002.
(1) Difference between claims and liabilities vis-à-vis non resident banks
 (only these reporting to the BIS).
as a ratio to GDP 
(September 2002)
Table 4.1: Currency mismatch of banks in 2002 
(1)
(percentage shares of foreign currency assets and loans)
Table 4.2: Banks' net external position 
(1)Czech Rep. Poland Hungary EU
Deposits 59.7 50 61.0 33 44.8 31 26.2 61
Securities 0.3 0 0.9 1 9.3 7 6.7 16
Loans 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.2 1
Shares and mutual 
funds 24.9 21 24.1 13 34.9 24 33.5 78
Insurance reserves 7.8 6 6.2 3 9.4 7 31.4 73
Other Accounts 7.3 6 7.8 4 1.5 1 2.0 5
Total 100.0 83 100.0 55 100.0 70 100.0 232
Source: Eurostat. 
(1) For the Czech Republic, data refer to 1999.
Table 5: Households' financial assets
 (1)
(end 2000; as a percentage share of total and, in bold, of GDP)
Czech Rep. Poland Hungary EU
Loans 43.9 8 86.2 8 99.6 6 91.7 60
Short t. 3.6 1 28.9 3 13.0 1 - -
Medium to long t. 40.3 7 57.4 5 86.6 5 - -
Other accounts 56.1 10 13.5 1 0.2 0 7.6 n.a
Residual items 0.0 0 0.2 0 0.2 0 0.7 n.a
Total 100.0 18 100.0 9 100.0 6 100.0 n.a
Source: Eurostat. 
(1) For the Czech Republic, data refer to 1999.
Table 6: Households' liabilities 
(1)
(end 2000; as a percentage share of total and, in bold, of GDP)Share of FX 
deposits
Share of FX 
loans/mortgages
Czech Rep. 10.3% n.a.
Hungary 15.7% 2.5%
Poland  19.5% 29.0%
Source: Own calculations on Central banks statistics.
(September 2002)
Czech Rep.  (2) +7.6%
Hungary +5.1%
Poland +5.7%
Source: Own calculations on Central banks statistics.
(1) The net foreign currency position is calculated as a difference between foreign exchange 
assets and liabilities. Assets/liabilities held abroad are taken from the BIS.
(2) Data on foreign currency liabilities were not available.
Net FX position
Table 7.2: Households net foreign currency
position as a ratio to GDP 
(1)
Table 7.1: Households exposure to exchange rate risk in 2002
(percentage share of foreign currency deposits and loans)Czech Rep. 1993:01-1997:05 Fixed
1997:06-2002:01 Floating
Hungary 1993:01-1995:03 Adjustable peg
1995:04-2001:04 Crawling peg (    2.25)
2001:05-2001:09 Crawling band
2001:10-2002:01 Fixed (   15)
Poland  1995:05-2000:03 Crawling band
2000:04-2002:01 Floating
Step Ger. U.K. Fr. It. Cz.Rep. Hun. Pol.
6 9.3 (4.0) 10.1 (3.9) 6.2 (3.3) 4.3 (3.0) 10.9 (6.1) 3.4 (5.3) 5.7 (4.8)
12 17.9 (6.6) 15.3 (6.1) 13.9 (6.6) 7.1 (4.4) 12.6 (6.7) 10.1 (10.0) 6.2 (5.2)
24 23.1 (8.5) 11.6 (6.3) 17.7 (9.9) 8.9 (5.2) 12.4 (7.8) 18.7 (14.0) 5.8 (5.6)
36 22.5 (8.6) 9.8 (5.5) 5.6 (9.4) 8.6 (4.8) 11.9 (8.5) 21.7 (14.8) 5.7 (5.9)
48 20.4 (8.0) 10.1 (5.9) 14 (8.9) 8.6 (4.8) 10.8 (9.0) 22.3 (14.7) 5.7 (6.2)
(1) The numbers in brackets are standard errors. For the four largest European economies estimates
are borrowed from Kim (1999), for the AC3 we use the period 1997:07-2002:01 for Czech Republic; the
period 1995:04-2002:01 for Hungary; the period 1993:01-2002:01 for Poland. Significance levels are
obtained by Montecarlo simulation.
Table 8: Chronology of exchange rate regimes
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